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Menu Costs and the Neutrality of Money
ABSTRACT
Amodel of endogenous price adjustment under money growth is presented. Firma
follow (a, S) pricing policies and price revisions are imperfectly synchronized. In theag-
gregate, price stickiness disappears and money is neutral. The connection between firm
price adjustment and relative price variability in the presence of monetary growth is also
investigated. The results contrast with those obtained in models with exogenous fixed
timing of price adjustment.
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Princeton University University of Southern California
Princeton, NJ 08544 Los Angeles, CA 90089-0035I. Introduction
Historically-determined nominal prices can lead to inertiain the aggregate level of
prices, leaving room for monetary shocks to influence realvariables. Formal models con-
necting the microeconomic behavior of nominal prices withaggregate price stickiness in-
clude models with staggered price andwage decisions [Fischer, 1977; Taylor, 1980; Blan-
chard, 1983b; Parkin, 1986J, models with partial adjustment ofprices (e.g.,Rotemberg
[19821), and the more recent menu cost" models of Akerlof and Yellen[1985], Blanchard
and Kiyotaki [1985] and Mankiw [19851. Wepresent an alternative aggregate model with
microeconomic price stickiness which emphasizes theimportance of endogenous timing of
price adjustments. The model provides conditions under whichmoney shocks have no real
effects.
A number of macroeconomic models of price stickiness havea common microeconomic
base: infrequent but large changes in nominal variablesare assumed to be more economical
then frequent small changes.' The models also share theassumption that the time between
successive price revisions is pre-set, and hence unresponsive to shocksto the economy. This
assumption is questionable both at the microeconomic level and in theaggregate. Formal
microeconomic models (e.g.,Sheshinskiand Weiss [1983]) strongl) suggest that morerapid
inflation will shorten the time between price revisions.Empirical evidence against the fixed
timing assumption is presented by Cecchetti [1986] and Liebermann andZilbefarb [i98s].
At the aggregate level, large monetary shocksmay increase the number of agents revising
their nominal prices in a given period. This in turn reduces theextent of price level inertia.
An important open question remains: whatare the real effects of monetary shocks with
endogenous timing of price revisions?
The present paper assumes that individual firms adjust theirprices using (a, 5)pricing
policies of Sheshinski and Weiss [1977, 1983]. To modelasynchronization, we make a
cross-sectional assumption on initial prices. The price level is derivedendogenously by
aggregating across firms. Aggregate price stickiness then vanishes despite thepresence of
1 -nominal price rigidity and imperfectly synchronized price revisions.
The presence of relative price variability as aconsequence of inflation is also observed
endogenously through aggregation of cross-sectional price data. Asimple formula is derived
linking nominal price adjustment by firms with cross-sectionalvariability of inflation rates.
The basic model is outlined in section II. Theneutrality proposition is presented in
section III. In section IV, the model is applied to study relativeprice variability. Section
V provides further discussion of the model and itsassumptions Conclusions are given in
section VI.
H. The Model
hA. The Aggregate Setting
We provide an aggregate model of price dynamics with individualfirms pursuing
asynchronous (a, S) pricing policies. The structure of theaggregate model is kept as simple
as possible to highlight the distinction between our model and others withasynchronous
price and wage decisions. These alternative models frequentlyassume a staggered pattern
of timing (e.g., Akerlof 11969], Fischer 119771,Taylorf1980]and Blanchard [1983b]).
Money growth is subject to continuous shocks. The stochasticprocess governing
monetary growth is taken as exogenous by all firms in the economy.2 Let M(t) denote the
logarithm of the money supply at time t, where time is measuredcontinuously. We assume
that the money supply process is increasing over time and doesnot make discrete jumps.
ASSUMPTIoN 1. Monotonicity and Continuity. Themoney supply does not decrease Over
time, M(t1) ￿ M(t2) for ij ￿ t2. Also, the money supplyprocess is continuous in the
time parameter t. Normalize such that M(0) =0.
The monotonicity assumption will rule out periods of deflation. Thecontinuity assumption
allows a simple characterization of firm pricing policies. Theassumption also plays a role
in analysing the cross-sectional behavior of prices. This issue is takenup below. The
monetary process is sufficiently general as to accommodate feedback rules. We will consider
2 -particular examples of monetary processes below.
There is a continuum of firms in the economy indexed by i E10,11. All firms face
identical demand and cost conditions. The assumed microeconomic structure is basedon
the menu cost model of Sheshinski and Weiss 11977, 1983J. Let q(t) andQ(t) represent
firm i's nominal price and the aggregate price index respectively, with p(t) andP(t) their
respective logarithms. The aggregate price index, P(t), is derived endogenously below




for all I E 10,11. We take r(0) as given.
The aggregatepriceindex, Q(t), is determined endogenously by aggregating individual
firms' nominal prices, q(t). The index is assumed to depend onlyon the frequency dis-
tribution over nominal prices. Because firms have menu costs of price adjustment,prices
may remain dispersed in the long run. Thus, the set of observed prices at any date may
be described by a time-dependent frequency distribution function,say Ct(q). The index
M assumed also to satisfy homogeneity; when nominal prices double,so does the index.3
ASSUMPTIoN 2. Symmetric Price Index. The aggregate price index, Q(t), depends only
on the frequency distribution of nominal prices and satisfies homogeneity,
(2) Q(t) =Q(Gt(q)),where C(q) is the proportion of firms i E 10,11
such that q(t) S q.
(3) If G,(q) =Gt3(Aq)for all q, then AQ(t1) =Q(t2),for any t1,t3 ￿ 0.
This condition is satisfied by a wide variety of common price indices.4 An example ofa
price index which satisfies assumption 2 is a simple average of nominal prices based on their
frequency distribution, Q(t) =fqdct(q). More generally, let Q(t) =fw(q, Cg(.))qdCt(q)
where w(q, C) represents weights as a function of prices q and the distribution of nominal
3 -prices C. The assumption requires the weights tosatisfy w(q, Cg1) =w(Aq,Cr3) when
C11(q) =Ct3(Aq)for all q. An example of such a set ofweights is w(q,C) =q/fqdc(q).
flB. The Market Setting
Consumer demand is assumed to dependonly on the firm's real price and on real
money balances.Writingthe arguments in log form, consumer demand facedby firm 1,
r1, is defined by
(4) r1ft)r(r1(t),.&f(t)— P(t)),
where rift) and M(t) —P(t)are the log of firm i's price and the log of real balances
rpectively.5 One rationale for this is to assume that real balancesenter consumer utility
functions, as in for example Rotemberg [1982,1983]. Note also that all firms have some
positive demand even though prices are dispersed. Thismay arise if the commodities are
imperfect substitutes. It may also be that consumer searchacross firms is costly and that
consumers do not recall prices posted by firms in earlierperiods, see Benabou 11985b1.
Costsare assumed to be fixed in real terms. Production at rateX1(t) gives rise to
real flow costs, C(x1ft)).Thisassumption rules out stickiness in nominal input prices,
including contractua wages. This prevents us fromaddressing the relationship between
price stickiness and wage stickiness, a topic of independentinterest, see Blanchard [1983J.°
Additional study of the present model withinput price stickiness is clearly desirable. All
profits are distributed to consumers, and firm costsaccrue to consumers as income.7
The good is assumed to be non-storable,so that the firm's output is supplied at the
same date it is produced. This removes intertemporallinkages embodied in inventories.
As a result, the only variables which influence the firm'sflow rate of real profits,B(t),are




-4Thus, the output of firm 1, X1(t), is a function of itsreal price and the level of realmoney
balances which solves the problem inequation (5),
(6) X1(t)=X(r1(t),Af(t)
—P(t)).
Let X(t)representthe constant dollar value ofaggregateoutput,X(t)J0' (q(t)/
Q(tflX4t)di =: 9'(t)X1(t)di.
Inthe absence of menu costs, the firm picks its instantaneous price, r(t), to maximize
flow profits B(r(t), M(t) —P(t)).°Nominalprice stickiness is introduced into the model
in the form of a real menu cost, fi, which is incurredeach time the firm changes its nominal
price.'0 This fixed transaction cost results inprice stickiness at the level of the individual
firm. Rather than responding smoothly andcontinuously to changes in the overall price
level the firm responds only occasionally, and withdiscrete price jumps.
We consider a firm which continuously monitors theprice level, and pursues an (a, S)
pricing policy, as introduced by Sheshinski and Weiss. Theimpact of this policy on the
dynamics of the firm's real price is illustrated in Figure I. Theinstant the log of the real
price, r(t), hits the fixed lower limit a, the firm adjusts its nominalprice, returning the
log of the real price to its upper limit, S. Let D S—arepresent the size of the firm's
price increase. Then, the changes in the firm's nominalprice within any time period 10,t}
are always an integer multiple of the pricerange, p(t) —p(O) = k(t)D,where k(t) ￿ 0 is
an integer. Noting that r(0)= p(0)and using the definition of the firm's realprice in
equation (1), we may formally characterize the (a, S)pricing policy as follows; r(t)[8,5]
and





Hence, changes in the log of the firm's real price arean integer multiple of D minus the
log of the price level.
[Insert Figure 1 about herel
- 5Two important requirements arenecessary for (s,S)-typepolicies to be optimal. One
requirement is stationarity of real balances over time, M(t) —P(t)=—P(O),so that
demand, 1's, is stationary. We will demonstrate that in equilibrium this requirement is
satisfied. The other requirement concerns restrictions on the form of theanticipated in-
flation process. Conditions for optimality of (a, S) pricing policies ina stochastic setting
have been considered by Sheshinski and Weiss j1983J, Danziger [1984] andmore recently
by Caplin and Sheshinski [1986]." Danziger considers a world with discrete inflationary
shocks. He demonstrates that when inflationary shocks arrive one at a time withexpo-
nentially distributed interarrival times, then the optimal pricing policy is of the (a,S)
variety.'2 With general inflationary processes, the optimal pricing policymay take a more
complex form.
The central qualitative feature of (8,5)pricing policies is that they make the time be-
tween successive price revisions endogenous: prices change more frequently when inflation
rapid than when it is slow. Alternative models of asynchronous price setting involve
fixed decision times regardless of ensuing shocks to theeconomy. Seen in this light, one
may be less concerned with the precise optimality of (s,5)pricing policies.'3 Rather, they
may be seen as a simple and tractable alternative to the assumption of a predetermined
pattern of price revisions.
Analysis of the time path of aggregate prices in our framework requires specification of
the initial distribution of prices across firms in theeconomy. it is assumed that firms' initial
real prices r1(O) are uniformly distributed over therange (a, S]. For ease of exposition, we
rtate the uniformity assumption with a frequency distribution F0(p) which defines the
proportion of firms with the logs of their initial prices p(O)nohigher than p.




6The uniform initial distribution of prices across theprice range (a, 5Jisthe analogue in
prices of the standard Assumption of uniformly staggered pricechanges over time. Indeed,
Assumption 3 is equivalent to an assumption of uniform staggeredtiming in the special
case where inflation is constant at some rate A >0.However, it will be apparent that
in a stochastic setting a uniform distribution of initialprices has significantly different
implications.
In a fundamental sense, Assumption 3may be viewed as a statement about the endoge-
nous tendency of prices to become uniformly distributed after a long history ofinflationary
shocks and pursuit of fixed (a.S) policies. This lies outside thecurrent framework since
firms pursuing identical (a, S) policies in the face of inflationretain forever the initial
difference in their real prices. However, if firmspursue slightly distinct (a, S) policies,
or randomize on their trigger price a (as in Benabou [1985a]), their realprices become
statistically independent of one another with the passage of time. A related resultfor
inventories states that, absent degeneracies, firms whichpursue (a, S) inventory policies
have inventory levels which are independent in the longrun, Caplin [19851.
111. Neutrality
We address the connection between asynchronous price decisions andaggregate price
stickiness. To what extent is the individual finn stickiness in nominalprices reflected in
aggregate price inertia? The central result of the paper is that real balances andaggre-
gate outputare invariantto monetary shocks. Price stickiness disappears in theaggregate.
Given (a, 5) pricing rules the initial distribution of realprices is invariant and remains
uniform. The aggregate nominal price index exactly reflects nominalmoney shocks. Con-
sumer demand as a function of real prices and real balances remains stationary. This
results in constant aggregate output.
In the absence of real shocks to theeconomy, money neutrality is appropriately defined
as follows.
7DEFINITION 1. Money is neutral if aggregate real output is invariant tomonetary shocks,
X(t) =X(O),for all 2 ￿ 0.
Monetary policy may influence the di8tribution of real prices across firms inour model, as
will be seen in section IV. However, these distributional effects cancel out in theaggregate.
Suppose that firms follow (8,5) policies in anticipation of constant real balances. That
1, firms expect that P(t) =M(t).Then, by the description of (a,S) pricing policies in
equation (7), we may calculate each firm's nominal price as a function of cumulativemoney
growth and the firm's initial price,
(9) p(t)k1(t)D+p1(O),
where k1(t) is an integer determined by the requirement that r(t)[a, S]. Proposition
1 verifies that aggregation of these nominal prices yields a price level equal to cumulative
money growth at each time 2, so that money is neutral.
The neutrality result may be understood by observing that the (a, 5)policy moves
real prices around a circle. The method of proof is easily illustrated usingFigure II. Points
on the circle represent the range of the log of the firm's real prices. At theapex of the
circle, the outer limits of the range are adjacent. At time 21, r(ti) is firm i's real price.
Inflation occurring between time 21 and 22 reduces the real price to rt(t2)as indicated by
the counter-clockwise motion. Between time 22 and 23, inflation drives the realprice down
to a, the price is then readjusted up to S and further inflation drives the realprice to
r1ft3).Itis critical to note that the rotation engendered by monetary growth is invariant
to the location of the initial real price on the circle, thus preserving the initialuniformity
at real prices.
[Insert Figure II about here]
PROPOsITIoN 1. Given Assumptions 1 to 3, money is neutral if firms follow (s,5) pricing
policies in anticipation of constant real balances.
8Proof of Proposition 1. Letmoney growth be written as an integer multiple of D and
a remainder, 6(t).
(10) M(t) =k(t)D+ 6(t)
where k(t) ￿ 0 and 6(t) ￿ 0 are chosen such that6(t) cD.If firms follow (s, S) pricing
policies and anticipate constant real balances, thenby equation (9), the log of each firm
i's nominal price can be expressed in terms ofthe components of money supplygrowth in
equation (10),
—fp(o)+k(t)D, forp1(0) > a+b(t), (n) —
1 p(O)+ Lk(t) + 1]D, for p(0) ￿ $ + 6(t).
Equation (ii) shows that ifs + 6(t) <p(0) ￿ S thena + M(t) <p(t) ￿ a i-M(t) + D —6.
Also ifs <p(0) a + 6(t) then a +M(t) + D —6cp(t) ￿ S + M(t). By uniformity of
initial real prices (Assumption 3), it follows thatp(t) —M(t)is uniform over the interval
(a, SJ, or equivalently,
(0forp￿a+M(t),
(12) Ft(p) = b/D forp=a+M(t) +6, withoCb< D,
(1forp￿S-i-M(t).
The frequency distribution over nominalprices is then given by G (q) Fg (In q).
Note that Gt(q) is defined over (et+M(t),e5+M(O].Thus, we may define Gt(eM(Ox) over
(e, a5] so that Gt(eMO)x) =Go(z)for x(e', E5J. Therefore, by the assumption of
a symmetric price index, Q(t) =eM(t)Q(o). Thus,we have verified that endogenously
derived inflation matches monetary growth and realbalances are constant, Q(t)/eM(t) =
Q(0).Furthermore, since r(t) =p1(t)
—.P(t) = pt(t)—M(t)is uniform over (a,S] for t ￿ 0
we have
Fl Pt
(13) X(t) =J e(t)X(rj(t),p(o))di=
J e"(°)X(r1(O),P(o))di, 0 0
so X(t) =X(0). Q.E.D.
9Consider an illustrative example. Note first that sincep (t) is uniformly distributed
on (a + M(t), S +M(t)], q(t) is distributed on (etM(t),e5M(t)}withdistribution G1(q) =




dq =e()(eS — e')/D=eM(0Q(O). M(t)
Thecentral feature of Proposition 1 is that it provides a simple framework in which
there are monetary shocks, asynchronous nominal price revisions, butno stickiness in
the aggregate price level. In fact, P(t) —M(t)=P(o).Thus it contrasts strongly with
monetary models with a fixed staggered pattern of price and wage revisions, which can
generate significant aggregate price stickiness (e.g., Akerlof [1969], Blanchard [1983J, and
Fischer [19771).Inqualitative terms, the difference between the results can be simply
explained. In the staggered timing framework, large monetary shocks draw aresponse
from a fixed fraction of the population, with the remainderpursuing an unchanged policy.
The size of the predetermined pool of decision makers will influence the extent ofprice
revision by those currently free to decide: onaverage, agents' prices adjust only partially
to large monetary shocks. In contrast, the (5, s) model makes the fraction of firms which
revise prices in any given period endogenous. Hence rapid growth of themoney supply
causes an increase in the number of price increases in a given period. Surprisingly,our
simple form of endogenous timing completely removes aggregate inertia.
The result also provides a new perspective on the emerging study ofmenu costs and
monetary policy in a staticsettinge.g., Akerlof and Yellen [1985], Blanchard and Kiyotaki
11985], Mañkiw [19851). Here, Akerlof [1985] argues that the presence of a smallmenu
cost may make it optimal for an individual firm to maintain a fixed nominalprice in the
face of a monetary shock. This may lead to a welfare loss larger than themenu cost itself.
The extension from the case of a single firm to theeconomy as a whole is based on a
representative agent framework. Since one firm fails to adjust its price, so do all firms,
and as a result there can be a significant real impact to theopen market operation.
10Taken literally, such reasoning can only beapplied for the first monetary shock to an
economy which had never before been out of static equilibrium. Even thesecond monetary
shock may have a different effect, since after the firstshock, the hypothesis that the initial
real price is at its equilibrium level fails. Proposition1 presents a simple setting where the
presence of menu costs indeed prevents many firms from revising prices.However, those
who do adjust their price do so discontinuously.Although only a few firms may adjust
their prices, they adjust their prices by a largeamount. The net result is that monetary
shocks are absorbed with no real impact. -
Proposition1 also provides a positive answer to a questionposed by Sheshinski and
Weiss 11983] for their model of (a, 5) pricingpolicies. They are concerned with providing
a consistent aggregate version of their model. They consider identical firmsfacing exoge-
nous inflationary shocks, unifonniy distributed with respect to the time oftheir last price
increase. Sheshinski and Weiss (1983,p. 523Jnotethat:
largeand/orclosely spaced shocks may lead to synchronization and hencechange the distribution. There is thus no simplecorrespondence between the process of
exogenous shocks and the process followed by the aggregate price level.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that with identical firms, consistentaggregation requires that
firms be uniformly distributed in terms of the log of their initial realprice levels rather than
the time of their last price change. The distinction is that ina stochastic setting uniformity
in timing is unstable, while uniformity in realprices is continuously sustained.'4
1V. Menu Costs and Relative Price Variability
In this section, we develop formulae linking inflation and firmpricing policies to rel-
ative price variability. These formulae can beseen as stochastic generalizations of the
deterministic price dispersion models of R.otemberg and Cecchetti[1981J, and Cecchetti
119851, which are based on staggered price setting. Our results alsoclarify the relation-
ship between price variability and the time period between successive observationsof the
economy.15
The association between inflation and relative pricevariability has been widely in-
11vestigated, see Fischer 119811 for a survey. The empirical research suggestsa positive
association between relative price variability and both the mean and the variance of the
overall rate of inflation.'0 One important line of research into inflation and relativeprices
originates with Barro 119761. Here it is inflationary variability rather than the rate of infla-
tion per se which drives relative price variability. As the variability of inflation increasesso
individual firm estimates of inflation become more widely dispersed, drivingapart firms'
pre-set prices.t7 Barro's approach is further developed by Cukierman [1979], Cukierman
and Wachtel 119821, Eercowitz [1981] and Parks 119781.
An alternative theory holds that inflationary variations in relative pricescan be caused
by nominal price inflexibility (Cecchetti [1985J, Mussa 11981] and Rotemberg 11983D.' Our
formulae lie in this alternative tradition, stressing the costs of changing nominalprices.
The basic characterization of relative price variability to be given here is basedon re-
peated observations of the economy, with successive observations separated by a fixed time
period of arbitrary length r> 0.With this discrete pattern of observations, cumulative
inflation during the tth time period is denoted llT(t). Proposition 1 allowsus to identify
the inflation rate with the (stochastic) growth of themoney supply,
(14) flr(t)E P[r(t+ 1)1 —P[rt!=Mfr(t+ 1)1 —M[rt].
Our results of this section require only that flt(t) is a stationary stochasticprocess. It
is also convenient to restrict attention to inflation ormoney supply processes which are
regularly behaved.
AssUJ.fpTIoN 1 A. Statior&arity. For any r >0,the process 11' (t) of equation (14) is
a stationary stochastic process, with long-run probabilities specified by the density
function #T(rI). The density of #(IT) is assumed to be non-atomic, withcompact
support.
As in the proof of Proposition 1, it is useful to separate inflation intoan integer
multiple of D and a residual.'9 Definition 2 provides the appropriate formalization.
12 -DEFINITION 2. With cumulative inflation measuredover periods of length r > 0, the
residualinflation process, br(t), isdefined as llT(t) taken modulo D.
In light of Assumption 1A, the residualprocess b'(t) is itself stationary, has compact
support, with long-run probabilities specified by the density function qt(b)satisfying,
(is) qt(b) =LvkD+b
Individualfirm price increases are also measured at intervals oflength r,
(16) nr(t) ep[r(t+ 1)J —
Tomeasure inflation, we use a specific price index. This is the standard Divisia index
of inflation, with equal expenditure shares for distinct firms I[0,lJ.
'I
(17) flt(t) eJ IIT(t)di. 0
The Divisia index is standardly employed in empirical studies ofrelative price variability
(e.g., Fischer [1981], Hercowitz [1981], Parks [1978] and Vining and Elwertowski[1976J).
The Divisia index is symmetric. By Proposition 1, it follows that theendogenous inflation
measure in equation (17) is consistent with monetary growth in equation (14).
Relative price variability, V(t), is measured as the dispersion of individual firminfla-
tion rates around the aggregate rate of inflation,
(18) r(t) J1111(t) — flT(t)]2di.
0
We are interested in the statistical properties of VT(t), and in particular theinfluence
of D, the size of individual price increases. Intuitionsuggests that increases in D may raise
the general level of relative price variability. A precise characterization of theexpected
level of relative price variability is contained in Proposition 2.
PRoPOSITION 2. Expected relative price variability is related to pricechanges, D, and
the residual inflation process, bT(t), as follows:
13 -(19) EEVT(t)I =E{bT(t)(D
—
withb'(t)as in Definition 2.
Proof of Proposition 2. To simplify notation, the superscript r is suppressed through-
out the proof. We first separate period t inflation in the standard manner,
(20) fl(i) =k(t)D+ 6(t),
withk(t)anon-negative integer, and 0 S 6(t)cD. The(a, S) pricing policies imply that
individual firm price increases obey
21 —f k(t)D forrift) >+ 6(t),
'' ''' —
1. [k(t)+ 1]D forr(t) ￿ a +6(t).
hence (n (t) —11(t))2takesvalue 62 for r (t) above a +6(t), (D —b)otherwise.But from
Proposition 1 we know that real prices r(t) are distributed uniformly over (a, 5] for t ￿ 0.





Finally,Assumption 1A implies that 6(t)isa stationary process, allowing us to take a-
pectations in (22). Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 shows that the range of individual price variation D is a central deter-
minant of the variability of individual price increases. However, interpretation of the result
Icomplicatedby the presence of the residual inflation process, b(t).Whilethe formula
does suggest a positive association between Dandrelative price variability, examples with
a negative association are readily constructed.2°
By changing the time interval between observations, it is possible to greatly simplify
the formulae of Proposition 2. The results are stated for a restricted class of inflation
14processes introduced in Assumption lA.2' The restriction isimposed to simplify proofs:
the analysis may incorporatemore general conditions.
ASSUMPTION 18. Two-rate inflationprocess. Monetary growth (and hence inflation) can
take place at one of two distinctrates, g and g, with g > 9L ￿0.The time spent
with inflation of g (resp. QL) is distributedexponentially with parameter Ajrj (reap.
AL).
Adesirable feature of the two-rate inflationprocesses of assumption 18 is that their simple
Markovian 8tructure is inherited by thediscretely observed process Ht(t). The state of
the system at time I comprises a specificationof all firms' instantaneous realprices, rift),
and the current inflation rate, Hor L. State transitions in the ensuing interval depend
only on cumulative inflation over the interval, and the levelof inflation at the end of the
interval. Such state transitions are thenMarkovian, since information available prior to I
M irrelevant to the probabilisticprogress of the system.22
With this background, we can provide thesimple formulae of Proposition 3 which
apply respective7y to "widely-spaced" and to"closely-spaced" observations of theeconomy.
The Proposition is proved in the Appendix.
PROPOSITION 3. Given assumptions 18, 2 and3, if firms follow (a, 5) pricing policies
and r is the period of observation thenexpected relative price variability satisfies the
following:
D2 (a) lim EVt(t) =—,6
rEv(e)1 (6) [Enr(t)j
=D.
The surprising feature of part (a) ofProposition 3 is that with widely separated obsenra-
tions, relative price variability depends onlyon D. It may be that the formula is roughly
- 15appropriate for semi-annual data where firms change prices at intervals ranging from one
to three months. The applicability of part (b) of Proposition 3 is harder togauge: the
observation period must be considerably shorter than the time between successive price
revisions.
Sheshinski and Weiss (1983) provide useful formulae for assessing the impact ofpa-
rameter changes on D =S—a,the range of the log of real prices.23 For gj, =0,they
establish that the range D is increasing in the price adjustment cost fiandincreasing in
the certainty-equivalent rate of inflation g where p =(AL+ p)gH/(AL + Aff + p) and where
p is the rate of interest. Changes in parameter values AL, Ag, p and g will affect the
price range and thus relative price variability as defined in Proposition 3a. However, it
ii difficult to establish a direct relation between the mean and variance of inflation and
relative price variability.
it is possible to determine the effects of menu costs on relative price variability. Be-
cause (a,S) policies may not be optimal, we assume that firms choose the best (a, 5)
bounds. Then, we use a time period r ￿ D/gH. Since 11(t) =k(t)D+ b(t) from equation
(20) the number of nominal price changes within the time period under observation is
always zero so that 11(t) =b(t).Then, we may write expected relative price variability,
using Proposition 2, as follows,
(23) E[Vt(t)J =.E{rI(t)[D
—
Theinflation process 11(t) is independent of adjustment costs and therange of prices is
increasing in fi.Thus,if firms follow the best (a, S) pricing policy, expected relative price
variability is increasing in the menu costs of price adjustment, fi.
V.Interpretation of Assumptions
The neutrality of money in our model is particularly dependent on the (a, 5) form of
firm pricing policies. For firms to follow (a, 5) policies, the monetaryprocess must at least
exhibit monotonicity and continuity. These requirements may be quite restrictive.
- 16When the monetary process is non-monotone, it will sometimes benecessary for the
firm to loweritsnominal price. The one-sided (s,S)pricing policies must be replaced
by two-aided pricing policies, as analyzed by Barro [19721.24Withthe two-sided pricing
policies, the neutrality proposition no longer holds: itmay even be that unusually rapid
monetary expansion is associated with increased real balances and vice versa.25 A theo-
retical difficulty in modeling two-sided policies is that theirproperties under aggregation
appear highly complex. Specifically, it is not possible to specify an initial cross-sectional
dhtribution of prices which survives shocks.26 In economicterms, this implies that a second
positive shock to the money supply may have very different effects than the firstpositive
shock. Such effects may well have non-intuitive implications: forexample, after two suc-
cessive positive shocks, output may be higher inresponse to a negative than in response
to a third positive shock to the money supply. In the absence ofa fully developed model,
such comments remain speculative.
The assumed continuity of themoney supply process has two roles. First, it gives rise
to the simple form of the individual firm equations for price transitions. Inparticular (7) no
longer holds in the absence of continuity, since if the real price falls bya discrete amount at
any given instant, then it may at some point fall strictly below s. The immediateresponse
of increasing the real price to S then involves a discretejump in the real price in excess of
1)S—a,contradicting (7). Sample path continuity plays an additional role in relation to
the uniformity Assumption 3. Jumps in the price level actas a coordinating device, pulling
many firms in the economy to adjust at the same instant, and eliminating uniformity. The
uniformity of initial prices is however the only distribution which is invariant to shocks.
Finally, there are additional conditions under which fixed alternative pricing policies
may be optimal. Significant alterations in the monetary process may lead agents to revise
trigger points.27 One possibility is that a sudden increase in the rate and variability of
money growth causes all agents to broaden their trigger range, raising S and lowering
a. In this case, real balances may rise in the short run as firms find insufficient benefit
17from a price change. This increase in real balancescorresponds to the effect noted in
the literature on the impact of menu costs ina static setting, as in Akerlof and Yellen
11985]. Once again, note that the short-run beneficial impact ofmonetary policy is not
stable. When real balances have risen enough,a sudden burst of price increases may be
triggered as all firms go to the very top of their real pricerange. This process will result
in a reduction of real balances to below their initiallevel, and a corresponding slowdown
in activity.
The neutrality result depends on firmsanticipating constant real money balances.
What would happen if firms anticipated systematicchanges in real money balances? For
aample if firms expect real money balances, and therefore demand, toincrease, this may
kigger an earlier price increase, thus counteracting the rise in realbalances. A formal
analysis of this possibility is of interest.
It is worthwhile noting a concern about theexogenous demand functions, F, particu-
larly in evaluating comparative dynamics. It would, ofcourse, be desirable to construct the
demand functions endogenously from consumerutility functions with either differentiated
products or consumer search. Ball and Romer 119861 derive such demandfunctions in a
general equilibrium model with differentiated products. Withendogenous search activity,
demand at a real price of rg(t) >0may be zero if all others firms have identical prices
r5(t)= 0,but positive if other firms have widely dispersedprices. Hence the functions
FJr1 (t), M(t) —P(t)]must be treated as conditional on the levels of S anda in the rest of
the economy. Benabou f1985bJ provides a thoroughtreatment of the interaction between
search and menu costs.
VI. Conclusion
The paper presents a model in which inflation is derivedendogenously through price
adjustment by firms, If firms pursue (a, S) price adjustmentpolicies and the log of real
prices are initially uniformly dispersed, thenmoney shocks are shown to be neutral. Thus,
nominal changes, such as monetary growth, do not haveaggregate real effects despite the
18presence of menu costs of price adjustment. Although money is neutral, we observe the
presence of relative price variability.
The model illustrates that individual firmprice stickiness and staggered timing need
not lead to aggregate price stickiness. This suggests that real effects ofmoney shocks may
depend more on fixed-length contracts than simply on asynchronous nominalprice adjust-
ment. Overall, the analysis highlights the importance of cross-sectionaltiming assumptions
in macroeconomic models.
19APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 3. To prove part (a) inlight of Proposition 2 requires only,
(Al) lim {E{v (t) (D — =
withb'(t)asin definition 2. Let Ht(x) denote the long-run cumulativedistribution of
(A2) H'(x) =jn(6)db.
The heart of the proof of part (a) is contained in Lemma 1.
LEMMA 1: ForO ￿ 6 ￿ D, lm,. Ht(x) =6/D.
PROOF:With the simple two-level inflation process of Assumption6, the individual firm's
discretely observed real price behavior is ergodic, with a uniquestationary density b(r(t))
which is uniform over (a, SJ. Ergodicity can be provedby applying the procedure of Caplin
and Spulber 11985, Proposition 1]. The trivial amendmentconcerns the fact that g and
CL may both be positive in the current case: in the earlier versionCL =0.The existence
of this simple ergodic distribution implies that,
(A3) limP{rt(t + r) 6 (5— 6,X) Irt(t)=S}=b/D.
But r(t) 6 Ea,SI and equation (7) show that the events{rt(t+r) (5—6,5)1 r(t) =S}
and {6(t)6r1(t)= 5)are equivalent. An identical argument applies conditions on
other initial prices. This allows the conditioning to be removedso that,
(A4) urn P{V(t) ￿ b) =b/D,
as claimed.
Q.E.D.
20Lemma 1 demonstrates that for 0 ￿ 6 ￿ D,Fm(b) —b/Din distribution. Appli-
cation of Proposition 8.12 of Breiman 119681 allowsus to take limiting expectations using
the uniform density,
(AS) iixn{E[V(t)(D — = AP(D
—b)db= — c; =
asclaimed.





forany given c(0,1). To confirm this, pick a time interval r below e(DIYH),sothat the
maximal inflation rate in any given period is below eD. Then,
(A7) E[bT(t)(D — = E[fl(t)(D—bt(t))] c DE(rV(t)).
In addition,
(As) E[bft)(D —b'(i))]￿ E[fl'(t)(D —eD)]=(1
—c)DELIIT(t)J.
Together,(AT) and (As) establish part (b). Q.E.D.
Princeton University and National Bureau of Economic Research
University of Southern California
21FOOTNOTES
1. An exception is Rotemberg [1983] who considers instead increasingmarginal costs
of nominal price revisions.
2. In general, the money growth process may be set as a feedback rule basedon the
history of output.
3. Individual firms set 3andS taking the price level as exogenously given. However,
for given levels a and 5, the index endogenously determinesP(O): will the exogenous and
endogenous indices be consistent? The answer is generally no: however, ifwe associate
higher real balances with higher levels of a and 5, there will be some initialspecification
cd real balances guaranteeing this static consistency, sincehigher real balances raise the
desired average real price, raising the endogenous level ofP(O) relative to the exogenous
level,
4. Blanchard and Kiyotaki [1985] and Ball and Romer [1986] derivesymmetric price
indices based on an underlying symmetric utility framework.
5. The assumption that demand is independent of futureprices rules out consumer
speculation. Benabou [1985a1 presents an analysis of optimal pricingpolicies in the face
of consumer storage and speculation. In principle, the futurepath of real money balances
may also influence real demand. For present purposes, Proposition 1 will allow us to ignore
this potentially complex dependence.
6. Gordon [19813 finds evidence for price stickiness forperiods with widely different
forms of labor contract. This suggests that there are importantsources of price stickiness
other than the behavior of input prices.
7. By Walras' law, market clearing in the commodity marketimplies market clearing
in the money market, see for example Rotemberg [1982].
8. The present formulation allows the firm to ration its customers. Thecase without
rationing can also be handled by the model, see Sheshinsici and Weiss [1983].
9. With standard assumptions, increases in realmoney balances which increase de-
mand for the commodity will also raise the firm's optimal realprice.
22 -10. There is an issue here concerning theproper treatment of menu costa. If these
are indeed real costs they should be explicitly included as part of output. Hencea closed
model of the economy should properly include a sector of variable size dedicatedto the
production of menus. This is ignored in our formulation.
11. Sheshinski and Weiss [1983) employ a special form of the stochastic inflation
process. Caplin and Sheshinski [1986] present a discrete time formulation with i.i.d. infla-
tionary shocks.
12. While the discrete nature of Danziger's inflationprocess contradicts Assumption
1, our analysis including the neutrality proposition nevertheless applies.
13. Even in the inventory literature, Arrow, Harris and Marschak [1951]study (a, 5)
policies because of their relative simplicity. The first general proof of optimality is due
to Scarf [19601. Further, stationary (a, 5) policies are frequentlyanalyzed and applied
in situations where they are undoubtedly sub-optimal (suchas in multi-echelon inventory
systems (Schwarz [1981]) and in more general non-stationary environments (Karlin and
Fabens [19591).
14. In a deterministic world with constant inflation, the two forms ofuniformity are
equivalent.
15. As Cecchetti [1985) notes in a non-stochastic setting, there isno cross-sectional
variance of inflation rates when the observation period is an integer multiple of theperiod
between price revisions.
16. Early studies include Graham [1930] and Mills [1927]. More recent work includes
Vining and Elwertowski [1976], Pagan, Rail and Trivedi [1983], Balk [1985] and Marquez
and Vining [1984].
17. According to this approach, the apparent association between the level of inflation
and relative price variability is a statistical artifact, resulting froman actual association
between the mean level of inflation and the variability of inflation. Thisrelationship is
explicitly investigated by Taylor [1981].
18. See also Carlton [1978] and Hubbard and Weiner [i9ss] who consider markets
with both spot transactions and nominal contracting.
19. The formal identification between (a, S) policies and the modulo arithmetic also
23 -plays & role in the inventory literature, (see Caplin[1985]).
20. For example with UT(t) uniformover [9, 10]anincrease in D from 8 to 9 reduces
EVT(t) from 9 to
21. Assumption lB represents a slightlymore general form of the inflation process
studied by Sheshinski and Weiss [1983].
22. Note that transitions in the rate of inflation betweendistance observations are
not independent of cumulative inflation. High cumulative inflationis associated with an
1suing inflation rate of 9H Hence transition probabilities for theMarkov process are
non-separable between real price transitions and transitions in the inflationrate.
23. The related (s,S) inventory literaturesuggests that increases in the mean and
variance of sales will raise order size. The well-known Wilsonlot-size formula (more familiar
the square-root formula formoney demand) expresses the relationship in simple form.
The more recent approximation formula of Ehrhardt[1979] has similar properties.
24. An analogous model ofmoney holding with both inflows and outflows is due to
Miller and On f 1966].
25. A suggestive example is presented in Blanchardand Fischer 119851.
26. This will of course, invalidate theneutrality proposition.
27. Blinder 119811 examines the related issue ofchanging trigger points and their
impact on aggregate inventory behavior.
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